14 When affronted with potential military confrontation, Congress authorizes the use of force, 15 and may circumscribe Executive operations during battle. 16 However, Congress cannot interfere with exclusive Executive prerogatives of the Commander in Chief during approved military operations. 17 The President, as Commander in Chief, or a delegate of Executive authority, directs troops, approves battle plans, executes tactical battlefield operations, 18 and normally signals when the war or hostilities terminate. 19 Separation of powers responsibilities then return to peacetime, the status quo.
Congress has sanctioned the use of the U.S. military pursuant to ("Congress has regulated in minute detail the manner in which armed forces may be deployed, enacted detailed rules governing the conduct of those forces, set forth rules of engagement, authorized the President to conduct hostilities limited in geographic scope, time, the type and number of forces that could be used, and the objects and purposes for which force could be used."); Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by "Declare War," 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 50 (2007) .
the explicit language of the Constitution for large-scale military operations on nine occasions. Congress has "declared war" five times: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the SpanishAmerican War, World War I, and World War II. 20 The other four authorizations include the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution for the Vietnam War in 1964, the Gulf War to expel Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait in 1991, the response to the September 11 terror attacks in 2001, and the approval to use force against Iraq in 2002 . 21 Prior to the Korean War in 1950, government officials, courts, and scholars concurred that the President must obtain authorization from Congress before ordering the use of military force in all hostilities other than self-defense. 22 
B. Historical Examples: Exigent Circumstances
James Madison affirmed that the President could only unilaterally order military force to "repel sudden attacks" on the U.S. and that Congress had to approve any other use of force. 23 The Framers delineated this exigent circumstance as a safeguard during intervals when Congress might not be in session. 24 In Martin v. Mott, the Supreme Court held that lacking congressional consent, the President has only "a limited power, confined to cases of actual invasion, or of imminent danger of invasion." 25 In Ex Parte Milligan, Justice Chase affirmed that the President possesses "inherent authority" to command the U.S. military into battle only when there is a threat to national sovereignty. Consider two prominent early examples in which the Executive did initiate unilateral actions related to war for imperatives, and the contention that ensued over the appropriate interpretation of those exigencies. In June 1807, British warships attacked the Chesapeake off the coast of Virginia, and the Jefferson Administration contracted to purchase timber for one hundred gunboats and materials for gunpowder. 27 Three months after the purchases, President Jefferson acknowledged Congress's appropriations power and recognized that authorization was required for the acquisition, but he justified his actions as necessary to defend the nation against the imminent possibility of war with Britain. 28 He presumed Congress would authorize the purchases had it been in session;
29 Congress agreed and paid for the resources. 30 The Chesapeake attack was a preliminary hostility that led Congress to declare war on Britain in the War of 1812. 31 The purchase was for an emergency situation to defend the country against an imperial power, and it did not involve ordering soldiers into hostilities.
President speaking, the American military has undertaken a more global presence since World War II with Congress's assent, and U.S. soldiers are commonly stationed in many foreign countries. 49 The President has not always sought congressional approval when deployments were not expected to result in conflict or when only lowintensity conflict was possible, whereas Presidents have requested Congress's approval and thereby complied with constitutional authorization requirements for situations expected to involve highintensity combat.
50
If the President does not anticipate conflict with a deployment, requesting an authorization from Congress may not be rational. The public, Congress, U.S. soldiers, and foreign States may be bewildered by the expectation of combat and flabbergasted by the decision to present such a signal. Likewise, when there is a possibility that minor operations could result in combat, it seems unlikely that the President will seek congressional authorization when war costs are low and the likelihood of victory is high. 51 Successful unilateral action could receive accolades, and there is minimal risk that a President would be punished for a successful unilateral military action with minor combat.
52
Alternatively, a President may prefer to obtain prior congressional approval to diffuse political responsibility if conflict occurs or something goes awry, or to alert the adversary of an elevated domestic resolve.
53
The next section surveys these possibilities with examples to address Congress's war powers authority and the constitutionality of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. 49 First, for the international dimension, the United Nations (U.N.) had recently been constituted and member State expectations for rules and resolutions were untested. The Truman Administration sourced the UN as authority and emphasized that he was contributing air and sea support to Korean soldiers in conformity with the U.N. Charter and "the resolutions of the Security Council of June 25 and June 27," which required North Korea to withdrawal forces. (1950)). The United National Participation Act created an "act of popular sovereignty" that required the US to view national security through an international lens that required U.N. Charter requires members to provide armed forces and other assistance by special agreement, 58 and the Security Council did request that all member States render assistance accordant with the resolutions. 59 However, the Korean War was not U.N.-controlled and progressed into a U.S. war with primarily the U.S. providing troops.
60
Later Presidents and other States did not adopt Truman's interpretation of a per se obligation to furnish military support when the Security Council authorizes a use of force. 61 Second, there was paltry opposition from Congress when Truman took unilateral action. 62 After U.S. soldiers were dispatched, some congressional Republicans argued that it was not a "war," that troops had been deployed over one hundred times when there was a risk of war, and that the Commander in Chief should be given discretion. 63 Democrats underscored that circumstances necessitated countenancing the President with political unity. [49:1 Korean War and affected the domestic milieu. 65 Members of Congress or citizens who challenged the Executive's interpretation of "communist threats" or the use of military action to confront a communist adversary could have been excoriated or subjected to UnAmerican Committee proceedings. 66 As an example of presidential temerity during the Red Scare, in 1951, after dispatching soldiers into combat in Korea, Truman declared he possessed unilateral authority to "send troops anywhere in the world" without congressional authorization. 67 Later Presidents were not so bold. 68 McCarthyism impacted millions of government and private sector employees for nearly ten years, 69 but was later renounced as a suppressive overreaction that chilled First Amendment rights. Accordingly, Truman's unilateralism during the Korean War should not confer precedential significance to "inherent authority" war power theorems. The WPR merely reiterated 150 years of consensus, notably by emphasizing that Congress's province over using force is unconstrained by semantic interpretations of the term "war." 93 The WPR expressed the intention intrinsic to "declaring war" and other provisions in the Constitution by assuring national interest is represented when the U.S. uses force against another country and when U.S. soldiers face potential harm. Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces. 100 Section 5(b) references section 4(a)(1), which specifies the conditions that require the Executive to terminate the use of force (which are also the conditions for which a report was presumably submitted 60 days earlier): "In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced-(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."
101 Given the historical consensus on war powers sharing between the President and Congress under the Constitution, section 5(b) should not elicit too much dismay. 102 The provision seeks to address military missions that Congress has not officially authorized, but has involved hostilities or is likely to involve combat. It merely reaffirms Congress's authority to authorize or curtail hostilities, including conflict that may erupt but may not have been anticipated at the time the military was deployed.
There are examples of situations where WPR applicability is ambiguous, and force might be employed in a manner inconsistent with constitutional war powers and jurisprudence. Suppose a President reasonably perceives that no "imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" 103 and deploys soldiers outside U.S. borders. The WPR is not applicable. However, if unanticipated confrontation erupts or potential hostilities become apparent, the President must provide official notice of: "(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed 100. WPR, supra note 9, at § 5(b). 101. Id. at § 4(a)(1). 102. See supra Parts II.A-B. 103. WPR, supra note 9, at § 2(a).
[49:1 Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement."
104 From this perspective of an unexpected small-scale hostility, one might contend the WPR could open a limited exception for a President to unilaterally deploy force for short periods even if Congress would have disagreed with the circumstances under which the soldiers were originally deployed.
Suppose a President interprets the WPR time frame as granting discretion in war-making, or views a factual circumstance as endowing a residual authority to exercise a commander-in-chief mission short of "war." Technically, when observing the original intent formulation recounted in Part II(A), the President only has the enumerated power of the Commander in Chief within the confines of Congress's grant of authority for a specific mission, and as military caretaker during peacetime. 105 Nonetheless, if Congress has not authorized a military action, an Executive might construe the WPR to effectively smuggle in a tenebrous use of military force prior to Congress expressly prohibiting bombing, missile strikes, or skirmishes. 106 However, no clause in the WPR grants the Executive a unilateral right to use force. The Executive must have a declaration of war, an authorization from Congress, act in defense of the nation, or consult with Congress to attain an informal assent for deploying the military into potential hostilities prior to an official vote. 107 Further, the President is required to specify the authority for military actions under all of these possibilities.
108
Many scenarios could conceivably result in commencing a use of force without proper authorization, but the straightforward restriction is that Armed Forces cannot be used for longer than 60-90 days unless Congress proactively grants authority.
109 Also, the WPR does not prevent Congress from immediately demanding that U.S. soldiers be withdrawn, which is specified in section 5(c). The WPR does not provide any affirmative right to the Executive to keep soldiers in combat through the 60-90 day time frame, but instead is a built-in 104. Id restriction that automatically mandates that military forces be withdrawn once the time frame runs.
110
If Congress did nothing before the period expired, the President would lack authority in the military conflict in question. 111 Granted, the WPR could provide utility in responding to exigencies that require limited force for national security. What if there is unmistakable knowledge of a perilous weapon production facility in a foreign country and rapid action from a covert strike force on the ground is required? Hostilities may not clearly be anticipated if the mission remains clandestine. Congressional authorization would compromise the mission or be tardy to prevent a conceivably disastrous consequence.
Alternatively, this mission might be authorized under WPR section 2(c) or, more likely, would be executed as a covert action outside of the WPR, which still requires notice to congressional leadership. 112 Advancing limited exceptions of presidential unilateralism amid alleged urgency creates three problems: it mandates layering contingencies; has potential to be unreasonably applied; and reeks of the same genre of arguments that were recently employed to countenance abusive interrogation methods to attain intelligence to defuse suppositious terror threats.
Second, suppose there is a possible humanitarian protection mission. Perhaps national security is not clearly invoked and justifications for U.S. intervention depend on the gravity of the situation, probability of potential harm to the vulnerable population, size of deployment, and dangerousness of the mission to the U.S. military. To what extent must there be congressional debate and approval? What if the President does not provide official, detailed notice, but engages in informal discussions with amenable select members of Congress; no humanitarian disaster erupted; and what was expected to be a deployment that could involve minor combat 110. Id. at § 5(b). 111. Id. 112. According the National Security Act of 1947, the president can authorize a covert action when "such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States, which determination shall be set forth in a finding." 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (2010) . If the president decides a "covert action" affecting "extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests" of the U.S., a phrase never defined, he need only report to the "Gang of Eight,"-the chair and ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees and the House and Senate majority and minority leaders. Alfred Cumming, Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress Is To Be Informed of US Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions, Cong. Res. Serv., 6-7, Jan. 18, 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m011806.pdf.
[49:1 turns into substantial hostilities? Congress has preempted the field for this contingency with the WPR and the President is without authority even if the President contends there were unexpected events after the initial deployment. The WPR put the President on notice before deployments were issued.
In short, since the WPR applies anytime armed forces are introduced into "hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,"
113 the lack of conflict since the WPR was adopted, particularly of an intense and prolonged nature, may evince compliance with section 5(b). Also, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, and the 2003 Iraq War were the first largescale deployments of troops into hostilities since the Vietnam War and they were authorized by Congress.
114
The fallout from the Vietnam War and the adoption of the WPR ostensibly impelled an abrupt reversal in presidential perceptions about unilateral action. Professors Barron and Lederman wrote:
In the wake of the Watergate revelations, Nixon's impeachment, and the public outrage over President Ford's pardon of the disgraced former president, President Carter took office in a context notably hostile toward claims of unchecked executive authority. Not surprisingly, the Carter Administration's approach to preclusive war powers did not seek to capitalize on the ground that had been laid by the Truman, Nixon, and Ford Administrations. Instead, Carter appeared to push in the opposite direction. Reagan filed a report two days after invading Granada, stating that he was exercising his authority as Commander in Chief in a manner consistent with the WPR.
129 Many members of Congress dubbed the assault illegal and unapproved, and filed suit to deem the action unconstitutional. 130 However, before Congress was able to react with legislation and before the court could address the issue, the controversy ended and troops were removed.
131
In justifying the invasion, the White House maintained that the island was inundated by political instability, a deterioration of law and order, and a propagating communist threat.
132
Reagan also contended the invasion was necessary to rescue U.S. citizens attending St. George's School of Medicine, and approximately one thousand American residents and tourists. 133 Public approval of the action rose, perhaps partially due to medical students applauding the offensive and expressing gratitude for being "rescued."
134 Reagan addressed the nation on October 27, 1983, and merged the issues of the invasion of Grenada and U.S. Marines deployed in Lebanon as signals of an expanding Soviet threat. 135 The UN General Assembly condemned the U.S. intervention as illegal by a 108-9-27 vote.
136
In 1985, Reagan declared an emergency and alerted Congress that Nicaragua's Sandinista government was a state sponsor of terror, capable of launching hemispheric-wide communist revolutions, and an "unusual and extraordinary" security threat since Nicaragua was a two-day drive from the U.S. border. 137 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Reagan's several-year covert CIA operations that organized, trained, financed, and supplied Contra insurgents to overthrow the democratically-elected Nicaraguan government was a violation of international law. 138 Consequently, Reagan withdrew the U.S. from the ICJ's contentious jurisdiction to avoid being mandatorily hailed before the court. 139 As for the domestic level repercussion, Professor Harold H. Koh called Iran-Contra "the tip of a much larger iceberg that crystallized during the Vietnam War . . . [and that] exposed systemic" problems in American foreign policy and deficiencies in legal frameworks recently enacted by Congress to oversee the Executive. 140 Investigations revealed that the Nicaraguan Contras were apparently involved in drug trafficking 141 and severe suppression of civilian opposition. 142 Colonel Oliver North testified about the Reagan Administration's covert support for the Contras, admitted that he "misled the Congress" about that assistance, and contended "I still to this day, counsel, don't see anything wrong with taking the Ayatollah's money and sending it to support the Nicaraguan freedom fighters."
143 President Reagan avoided serious backlash by "claiming ignorance." 144 Thus, although the Reagan Administration provided financial and military assistance to a long-term foreign hostility, it did not implicate the WPR because this assistance evidently did not entangle U.S. military soldiers in combat. However, the financial assistance did violate congressional appropriations restrictions, which triggered a criminal investigation.
President Bush sought authorization from Congress that was congruous with WPR requirements before taking action in the 1991 Gulf War, and before deploying troops to Somalia. 145 Bush notified congressional leaders prior to the invasion of Panama in 1989 even though Congress was not in session. 146 However, the action was assuredly unsurprising given the media coverage. Possible actions against President Noriega were front page news stories for months prior to the action, and included crazy episodes of officials leaking "covert" operations against Noriega to the press and newspapers choosing to publicize the operations prior to execution. 147 It also seems unusual to regard Panama as an invasion when the U.S. military had stationed between 10,000 and 60,000 troops at fourteen bases in Panama since World War II.
148
The House passed a resolution in support of the invasion with a 389-to-26 vote. 149 
B. CNN Effect
Scholars contend that global news operations have impelled leaders to deploy force for momentary interventions. Policymakers react to television news and evolving populace perceptions influenced by media operations: "television coverage, primarily of horrific humanitarian disasters . . . forces policy makers to take actions they 151 In terms of whether the U.S. Congress formally authorizes action, if the media instills a cognitive impact on the populace that endorses an action and the President orders a military operation without congressional approval, perhaps it becomes more taxing for Congress to later convincingly object due to solid populace approval for the military involvement. Moreover, the circumstances generating military engagement were no secret to Congress because the foreign affair pervaded the news. While this process is certainly not a constitutional doctrine and exhorts apprehensions over whether the White House aroused the news coverage with agenda setting, or whether media outlets appropriately accentuate the events, one might construe that the network news effect could engender an informal populace sanction for a minor use of force. Nonetheless, these operations were limited and there was still often formal or informal Executive consultation with Congress.
The global community was concerned about Somalia. A Security Council Resolution called for humanitarian intervention.
152
The news broadcasted poor people and suffering children in Somalia, which aroused public support of military involvement even without clear national security interests at stake. 153 Clinton met with both Republican and Democratic congressional leaders regarding the use of U.S. forces in Somalia. 154 The President and congressional leaders agreed that U.S. soldiers could only be used for limited combat and to support UN peacekeepers, and that all forces would need to be withdrawn by March 1994. 155 U.S. soldiers were involved in minor melees with militias. 156 In September 1991, the Haitian military led a coup that deposed the civilian government, and Clinton deployed the Navy to enforce a Security Council-approved embargo. 157 To reinstall the civilian government in 1994, Clinton deployed over twenty thousand U.S. troops to Haiti for security and policing operations that would involve minimal combat. 158 The human rights abuses were on the international diplomatic agenda and news, and heightened public sensibility seemed to endorse action to prevent a possible humanitarian calamity. 163 In 1999, President Clinton initiated bombing operations on Yugoslavia, and provided an informational report, consistent with the WPR requirements, prior to the action and continued to impart congressional updates during seventy-nine days of bombing operations. 164 Clinton justified his immediate authority for action on NATO deliberations. 165 In Campbell v. Clinton, plaintiffs contended that the President's orders were unconstitutional, but the court held that the case was nonjusticiable because the plaintiffs lacked standing. 166 Members of Congress provided a barrage of diverse positions both on the bombing and on entry of troops, 167 but the Senate later approved the airstrikes via resolution, 168 and there was a 213-to-213 vote in the House of Representatives. 169 troops for potential emergencies and peacekeeping operations when congressional legislation, the WPR, and/or military spending measures interacted with presidential discretion, since hostilities were uncertain (as with Haiti and Rwanda). 170 However, it appears that Clinton was much more open with Congress than his predecessors. 171 The "CNN Effect" seemed poignant during the Clinton Administration and one might also view that the CNN Effect has been influential during the Obama Administration. Global news operations televised vivid portrayals of government abuse on protesters in Libya and Syria, ostensibly influencing American populace sentiment in foreign policy. 172 However, for both Clinton and Obama, questions remain over the WPR's applicability to bombing operations.
V. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS AND CONTEXT TO CLARIFY SECTION 5(b)
Precedent indicates that the WPR normally functions effectively and has not been considerably abused.
173
The applicability and contextual constitutionality of section 5(b) of the WPR turns on two factors. First, prior Presidents have expressly or impliedly upheld section 5(b) by observing the time limitations, 174 and Presidents have habitually provided notice and updates accordant with section 3. 175 Nonetheless, there were some actions that may have violated the WPR in minor ways. Obama's bombing operations on Libya were similar to Clinton's bombing operations on Yugoslavia, but the questions remain over whether those operations are within the parameters of the WPR, 176 and whether unilateral bombing actions are consistent with war powers in the Constitution.
Delving more deeply into that query, the second factor to consider is whether the Framers of the Constitution intended "declare war" or the use of force to only address the political sphere and national interest of ordering soldiers into combat, or whether they intended to include the political and legal ramifications of using force when soldiers do not need to be deployed into combat. Obviously, the Framers did contemplate military operations involving distant melees from cannons and vessels, but assuredly they did not consider stealth bombing operations or offshore battleships firing missiles with satellite navigation and targeting operations.
The WPR does not differentiate between projectiles and soldier incursions. The WPR generally applies and section 5(b) is invoked by the "use of United States Armed Forces" into hostilities that occur "[in] the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation."
177 Armed "soldiers" do not fight in airspace and no WPR provision refers to "soldiers," "troops," or any synonym. If high-altitude bombs or missiles are used, but the target cannot retaliate to place U.S. Armed Forces into a hostile situation, perhaps the WPR does not apply. However, WPR inapplicability does not mean unilateral bombing operations by default comport with an Originalist or Structuralist interpretation of the language of war powers in the Constitution.
178
It might be reasonable for Congress to adopt an amendment to or interpretation of the WPR that clarifies whether it only applies to U.S. soldiers in combat or to the use of force generally. Otherwise, debate is apt to fester on the question of what type of conflict implicates the WPR or starts the WPR 60-to-90 day clock. In addressing this question, it is important to recognize not only that military technology has assuredly advanced since the WPR was adopted in 1973, but also the historical context that induced Congress to adopt the WPR. Symmetry might bridge the gap between axiomatic war powers interpretations and the cult of inherent authority that swelled during the so-called war on terrorism.
The WPR was missioned with confining unreasonable and unconstitutional assertions of unilateralism. Difficulties began after President Truman introduced U.S. troops into the Korean War without Congressional authorization. However, the exigencies of the moment, uncertainty in U.S. obligations under the newly-constituted United Nations Charter, and McCarthy's Un-American committees that thwarted domestic dissent, make this case problematic to enlist as 177. WPR, supra note 9, at § § 2(a), 4(a)(2), 5(b). 178. Bejesky, supra note 12.
precedent to expand presidential war power authority. Prior to the Korean War, there was consensus-the Commander in Chief has domain to direct U.S. soldiers into battle, while the President's authority is activated, parameterized, and delineated by Congress. 179 The Commander in Chief should not exceed that delegation of authority and is required to adhere to congressional mandates even after the military conflict begins. 180 This debate surfaced following the Civil War, which was arguably the most expansive exercise of unsanctioned commander-in-chief action prior to the Korean War.
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In 1862, and during Civil War debates, Senator Howard offered what was then the consensus about war powers and the prevailing position in the legislation at issue. 182 Howard stated:
Should the President, as Commander-in-Chief, undertake an absurd and impracticable expedition against the enemy, one plainly destructive of the national interests and leading to irretrievable disaster . . . would the Senator rise in his seat here and insist that Congress has no power to interpose by legislation and prevent the folly and the crime? [Responding to Senators advocating executive discretion for confiscating enemy property and plenary authority over military direction] And yet his doctrines as here announced would impel him to exclaim, 'the country is without remedy; Congress is powerless . . . It is the will of the Commander-in-Chief . . . Sir, this new heresy deserves rebuke.
183
After the Korean War, Presidents asserted more war powers authority, but Congress also produced restrictive statutes, including those that regulated the conduct of ongoing campaigns. 184 Legislative measures corralled Executive war powers, and "the Supreme Court has never held that any statutory limitations on substantive executive war powers have constitutionally infringed the core prerogatives of 179. Id. 180. Id. 181. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 669 (1862) (Congress provided no formal declaration of war, but it was a state of war that "all the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in the history of the human race.").
182. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3006 (1862) (only three Senators opposed the legislation).
183. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2969 (1862).
the Commander in Chief." 185 Alternatively, the Supreme Court has invalidated many presidential wartime acts "precisely because they lacked congressional authorization." 186 Since the 1980s, high-tech weaponry and power disparity extended U.S. capability of employing force with lessened expectation of U.S. casualties; while during the 1990s global media operations broadcasted humanitarian catastrophes to stir populist sentiment to intervene in foreign humanitarian misfortune. Unless Congress is given an opportunity to exercise official war power authority prior to hostilities that may involve minor conflict or distant bombing operations, these instances could be viewed as compelled Congressional acquiescence. 187 Apparent transgressions may open new positions that are based more on rhetoric than fact, 188 but most examples seem to comport with the unofficial political practice between the Executive and Congress that permits the President to dispatch soldiers without congressional approval when there is no serious risk of hostility.
189
The precedent is limited since there have only been a handful of questionable cases since 1973, in which Congress did not grant authority before soldiers were dispatched and did eventually engage in hostilities. On the other hand, there are regularly occurring events around the world in which presidents might have wanted to dispatch U.S. troops but did not, which gives rise to arguments of selection bias compared against a broader pool of potential cases. Perhaps this is evidence that presidents implicitly understand that congressional assent is required before ordering the use of military force.
The greater danger of unreasonable and unsanctioned use of military force lies in the President offering spurious information to Congress, and Congress relying on falsities to activate war powers. 
